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Domestic Relations
by Barry B. McGough*
Elinor H. Hitt"
and Abigail M. Herrmann*
This Article addresses significant case law during the survey period
from June 1, 2016 through May 31, 2017.1
I. PRENUPTIAL AND POSTNUPTIAL AGREEMENTS

The Georgia Supreme Court reviewed two cases involving a prenuptial
agreement or a postnuptial agreement. 2 In Vakharwala v. Vakharwala,3
an alimony waiver found in a prenuptial agreement was at issue. The
parties married in 2012. Prior to marriage, the husband and the wife
executed a prenuptial agreement, which stated, in pertinent part, that
"in the event of a marital separation or dissolution, it is agreed and
understood that neither party shall seek or obtain any form of alimony
or support from the other."4 The husband filed for divorce in 2014 and a
final decree was entered September 23, 2015, reserving the issue of legal
fees. During the pendency of the litigation, the trial court entered orders
*Partner in the firm of Warner, Bates, McGough, McGinnis & Portnoy, Atlanta,
Georgia. University of California at Berkley (A.B., 1963); University of California, Berkeley,
School of Law (LL.B., 1966). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
"Partner in the firm of Warner, Bates, McGough, McGinnis & Portnoy, Atlanta,
Georgia. University of Georgia (B.S.Ed., 1993); Georgia State University College of Law
(J.D., 2007). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
*-Associate in the firm of Warner, Bates, McGough, McGinnis & Portnoy, Atlanta,
Georgia. University of Georgia (B.S., 2014); Georgia State University College of Law (J.D.,
2017). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. For an analysis of domestic relations law during the prior survey period, see Barry
B. McGough, Elinor H. Hitt & Katherine S. Cornwell, Domestic Relations, Annual Survey
of Georgia Law, 68 MERCER L. REV. 107 (2016).

2. See generally Vakharwala v. Vakharwala, 301 Ga. 251, 799 S.E.2d 797 (2017);
Murray v. Murray, 299 Ga. 703, 791 S.E.2d 816 (2016).
3. 301 Ga. 251, 799 S.E.2d 797 (2017).

4. Id. at 251-52, 799 S.E.2d at 798-99.
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requiring the husband to pay the wife $24,000 in temporary support
before temporary support was suspended upon the prenuptial agreement
being enforced. The trial court also entered orders directing the husband
5
to pay the wife's counsel $25,000 in temporary attorney's fees.
After the divorce was granted, pursuant to section 9-15-14(b) 6 of the
Official Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.), the trial court entered an
order "finding [the] [h]usband's conduct had unnecessarily expanded the
7
litigation" and awarded the wife $98,385 in attorney's fees. Pursuant to

O.C.G.A. § 19-6-2,8 the wife was awarded an additional $60,000 in
attorney's fees. The husband appealed, arguing that the attorney's fees
awarded were not proper and, even if they were proper, the trial court
erred in failing to offset against the final attorney's fees award the
amount the husband previously paid as temporary support and
attorney's fees.9
The order granting the wife's motion for attorney's fees, pursuant to
O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14(b), was based on findings of fact supported by the
record that the husband engaged in numerous acts of improper conduct
throughout the litigation. These acts included delay, harassment, and
represented a blatant abuse of the discovery process, highlighted by the
husband's on-the-record statement that he would, "spend whatever it
takes to win." After reviewing the record, the appellate court rejected the
husband's assertion that the award of attorney's fees was unsupported
by evidence and affirmed this portion of the fee award. 10
The order granting the wife's motion for attorney's fees, pursuant to
O.C.G.A. § 19-6-2, was based upon the disparity in the parties' financial
situations, the husband's depletion of the parties' joint bank accounts of
$170,000 one day before he filed the complaint, and that the wife had to
spend excessive funds defending herself against the husband's baseless
allegations." In reversing this portion of the attorney's fees award, the
appellate court determined that due to the alimony waiver in the parties'
prenuptial agreement, the trial court erred in awarding attorney's fees
pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 19-6-2.12 Fees awarded under this section are
considered to be part of temporary alimony because they are awarded to

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Id. at 251-52, 799 S.E.2d at 798.
O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14(b) (2017).
Vakharwala, 301 Ga. at 252, 799 S.E.2d at 798-99.
O.C.G.A. § 19-6-2 (2017).
Vakharwala, 301 Ga. at 252, 799 S.E.2d at 799.
Id. at 253-54, 799 S.E.2d at 799-800.
Id. at 253, 799 S.E.2d at 800.
Id. at 254, 799 S.E.2d at 800.
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enable the spouse to contest issues in an action covered by the statute. 13
Further, misconduct of a party does not provide a basis for attorney's fees
under O.C.G.A. § 19-6-2, though in this case, the misconduct authorized
an award under O.C.G.A.

§ 9-15-14(b).14

The husband also asserted that amounts he paid to the wife for
temporary support and temporary attorney's fees should be offset against
a final fee award. 15 However, fees awarded under O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14(b)
are unrelated to alimony and are not subject to offset for amounts the
husband paid as temporary support and attorney's fees. 16 Pursuant to
O.C.G.A. § 19-6-2, the court reversed and vacated the attorney's fee
award, therefore the argument for offset is rendered moot. 17 In addition,
this issue was not raised in a previous motion or proceeding, and it cannot
be considered for the first time on appeal.18
In Murray v. Murray,19 fraud rendered a postnuptial agreement
unenforceable. 20 In early 2014, after a thirty-four-year marriage, the
parties began discussing divorce. The husband wanted to divorce, though
the wife wanted to save the marriage. The wife wrote the husband an
apology letter renouncing her rights in the marital estate. The wife said
the letter was written at the husband's request and said what the
husband wanted the letter to say. The husband then had counsel draft a
formal postnuptial agreement, providing for the disposition of the
couple's marital estate upon dissolution of the marriage by divorce or
death, which was favorable to the husband. The agreement was signed
on June 5, 2014.21
In October 2014, after unsuccessful marriage counseling, the wife filed
for divorce, and the husband moved to enforce the agreement. The wife,
whom the trial court found credible, testified that the "[h]usband had
induced her to sign the [a]greement with the promise that he would tear
it up as soon as she signed it, making her believe her execution of the
[a]greement was merely a symbolic gesture of love and devotion that
would have no practical effect." 22 After determining the husband
procured the wife's signature on the agreement under the pretense that

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id. at 255, 799 S.E.2d at 801.
Id.
Id. at 255, 799 S.E.2d at 801.
Id.
Id. at 255-56, 799 S.E.2d at 801.
Id. at 256, 799 S.E.2d at 801.
299 Ga. 703, 791 S.E.2d 816 (2016).
Id. at 706, 791 S.E.2d at 819.
Id. at 703, 791 S.E.2d at 817.
Id. at 703-04, 791 S.E.2d at 817.
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the agreement would be destroyed and never enforced, the trial court
found the agreement to be unenforceable based on the husband's fraud.23
The husband appealed the trial court's order. 24
The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the lower court because it
determined the evidence supported the trial court's conclusion that the
agreement was unenforceable because the husband's promise to tear up
the agreement amounted to fraud. 25 Georgia law defines "fraud" as an
action that "may be consummated by signs or tricks, or through agents
employed to deceive, or by any other unfair way used to cheat another." 26
The record showed, however, that while the husband did not file for
divorce, he did not destroy the agreement as he had promised. Instead,
the husband retained the document for nearly six months, during which
time the parties were attempting to reconcile their marriage, and
produced it for enforcement when the wife later sought a divorce.27 The
husband's prolonged retention of the agreement that he promised to
destroy as soon as the wife signed it, coupled with the subsequent
attempt to enforce it, was sufficient to establish the existence of fraud,
especially in light of the confidential relationship that exists between
spouses, which entitles them to repose confidence and trust in each
other. 28
II. MARRIAGE
29

In Russell v. Sparmer, Russell sued Sparmer to dissolve their
domestic and business partnerships. 30 The wife's claim for divorce arose
from an unlicensed ceremonial and self-solemnized marriage, which the
parties entered into in Greece. They bought matching rings, exchanged
vows in front of a church, and later held themselves out to be married.
The claim was not based on common law principles. The trial court
granted summary judgment to Sparmer on the divorce claim and
awarded attorney's fees under O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14.31 The Georgia Court
of Appeals held that Russell's claim for divorce was neither frivolous nor
interposed for delay.3 2 Additionally, the court noted that the parties had

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id. at 705, 791 S.E.2d at 818.
Id. at 704, 791 S.E.2d at 818.
Id. at 705, 791 S.E.2d at 818.
Id. (quoting O.C.G.A. § 23-2-56 (2017)).
Id. at 705-06, 791 S.E.2d at 818.
Id. at 706, 791 S.E.2d at 818-19.
339 Ga. App. 207, 793 S.E.2d 501 (2016).
Id. at 207, 793 S.E.2d at 502.
Id. at 208, 793 S.E.2d at 503.
Id. at 213, 793 S.E.2d at 507.
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the capacity to contract, consented to marry each other, and possessed a
present intention
to
be married
to
each other. 33 Neither
self-solemnization of the marriage, the officiant's lack of authority, nor
the lack of a license rendered the marriage invalid. 34 In terminating her
business partnership with Sparmer, Russell "did not want to leave open
the possibility that she and Sparmer might be legally married." 35
III. PROCEDURE
36

In Devlin v. Devlin, a case of first impression, the court of appeals
held that pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and
Enforcement Act (UCCJEA),37 it is within the discretion of the trial court
to allow a party to present telephonic testimony. 38 In June 2014,
following the death of her son, the grandmother, through a Pennsylvania
court, was awarded limited grandparent visitation with her
grandchildren. 39
In February 2014, the mother and children moved to Georgia, and in
December 2014, the mother filed an action in Georgia to enforce and
modify the custody and visitation order entered by the Pennsylvania
court. In a hearing limited to the issue of jurisdiction, the court allowed
40
the grandmother to participate pro se in a limited manner by telephone.
Two months later, the trial court scheduled mediation for the parties
to take place in Georgia. The trial court denied the grandmother's request
to participate by telephone, and the grandmother did not appear at
mediation. The grandmother then filed a motion for an emergency
hearing regarding her request for two weeks of unsupervised visitation
with the children in Pennsylvania each year, and requested to testify
telephonically. The trial court scheduled a final hearing on the
grandmother's request and ordered the grandmother "to appear in person
at the hearing, if she wishe[d] to be heard on this motion." 41 The
grandmother did not appear for the final hearing and pursuant to
O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3, 42 the trial court denied her request for grandparent

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 211, 793 S.E.2d at 505.
Id. at 212, 793 S.E.2d at 506.
Id. at 211, 793 S.E.2d at 505.
339 Ga. App. 520, 791 S.E.2d 840 (2016).
O.C.G.A. §§ 19-9-40-104 (2017).
Devlin, 339 Ga. App. at 524, 791 S.E.2d at 842.
Id. at 521, 791 S.E.2d at 840.
Id. at 521, 791 S.E.2d at 840-41.
Id. at 522-23, 791 S.E.2d at 841.
O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3 (2017).
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visitation. The grandmother appealed claiming it was error for the trial
court to deny her request to testify telephonically. 43
The UCCJEA provides that "[a] court of this state may permit an
individual residing in another state to be deposed or to testify by
telephone, audiovisual means, or other electronic means before a
designated court or at another location in that state."44 Other states have
concluded that this portion of the UCCJEA permits, but does not require,
a trial court to allow telephonic testimony. 45 In Georgia, a trial judge has
broad discretion in regulating the conduct of counsel, parties, and
witnesses, and in prescribing the manner in which business shall be
conducted. 46 A witness's personal appearance in court serves important
policies and purposes assisting the trier of fact, including the following:
evaluating the witness's credibility by allowing his or her demeanor to be
observed firsthand; helping establish the identity of the witness;
impressing upon the witness the seriousness of the occasion; assuring
that the witness is not being coached or influenced during testimony;
assuring that the witness is not referring to documents improperly; and
providing for the right of confrontation of witnesses. 47 Here, the trial
court allowed the grandmother to appear by telephone in a hearing to
determine its jurisdiction. After allowing the grandmother to appear by
telephone, the trial court denied the grandmother's subsequent requests
to appear by telephone for mediation and the final evidentiary hearing
on the issue of grandparent visitation. Given the numerous reasons that
a personal appearance is preferable, the trial court did not abu'se its
discretion in requiring the grandmother to travel to Georgia. 48 While the
grandmother contended the trial court should have determined that she
was able to travel to Georgia without financial harm before denying her
request, Georgia law does not mandate that the trial court make such a
finding. 49 Further, the grandmother failed to provide the trial court with
the necessary evidence to make such a determination, and when she
ultimately provided it in connection with the costs of her appeal, the trial
court determined that she was not indigent.50

43. Devlin, 339 Ga. App. at 523, 791 S.E.2d at 841-42.
44. Id. at 524, 791 S.E.2d at 842 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 19-9-50(b) (2017) (emphasis
added)).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 525, 791 S.E.2d at 843.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 525-26, 791 S.E.2d at 843.
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IV. CHILD CUSTODY

The supreme court addressed issues relating to the court's power and
child custody. 5 1 First, the supreme court clarified its authority under
O.C.G.A. § 31-10-9(e)(3) 52 as it relates to the child's surname. 53 In Denney
v. Denney, 54 the child was born after separation but before the divorce
was finalized. The child was given the mother's maiden name and the
birth certificate did not list the father's name. The trial court found that
the father was the "legal and biological father," but concluded it was
without authority to correct the child's surname.55 According to O.C.G.A.
§ 31-10-9(e)(3), "the surname of the child shall be entered on the
certificate of birth in accordance with the finding and order of the
court."5 6 The supreme court, in interpreting the plain language of the

statute, ruled that the trial court had authority to change the child's
surname and when doing so should consider the best interest of the child
when making a finding regarding the minor's surname.5 7
Next, in Bales v. Lowery,5 8 the supreme court reversed the trial court's
denial of the mother's habeas corpus petition for the return of her
daughter.59 The mother and the father shared joint legal and physical
custody; however, the divorce decree specified that the children were to
live with the mother during the school year. The older daughter resided
with the father for the last two school years. When the mother requested
the daughter return to live with her for the upcoming school year, the
father refused. The mother filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in
Baldwin County. In response, the father stated he filed a petition for
modification in Henry County. In reality, the father had not filed a
modification. Relying on the father's inaccurate statement that he filed a
modification and the daughter's interview, the trial court denied the
mother's petition.6 0
In reversing the trial court, the supreme court determined that
because the father did not allege the mother lost her right to custody, nor

51. See generally Denney v. Denney, 300 Ga. 622, 797 S.E.2d 456 (2017); Bales v.
Lowery, 299 Ga. 200, 787 S.E.2d 166 (2016); Altman v. Altman, 301 Ga. 211, 800 S.E.2d
288 (2017).
52. O.C.G.A. § 31-10-9(e)(3) (2017).
53. Denney, 300 Ga. at 624, 797 S.E.2d at 457.
54. 300 Ga. 622, 797 S.E.2d 456 (2017).
55. Id. at 623, 797 S.E.2d at 457.
56. Id. at 623-24, 797 S.E.2d at 457 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 31-10-9(e)(3)).
57. Id. at 624, 797 S.E.2d at 457.
58. 299 Ga. 200, 787 S.E.2d 166 (2016).
59. Id. at 200, 787 S.E.2d at 167.
60. Id. at 200-01, 787 S.E.2d at 167-68.
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did the father claim that custody had been transferred to him, the trial
court was unable to disregard the custody provision in the decree. 61 The
correct remedy for changing custody would require filing a petition for
modification. 62
In Altman v. Altman, 63 the supreme court vacated a trial court's
custody order and reversed a sealing order. 64 Before the trial court made
a final custody decision, there was a psychological evaluation of the
family, where the evaluator said the father should have primary custody,
as the mother had some psychological issues. Upon further therapy and
evaluation, another report was submitted also identifying the father as
the parent who should have primary custody. At the final hearing, the
trial judge interviewed the children without counsel or the parties
present and over objection from the father. After allowing the father's
court reporter to take down the transcript of the interview, the trial court
ordered the transcript to be sealed as "FOR [THE COURT'S] EYES
ONLY." This transcript was never published to the parties. The trial
court then entered an order granting the mother primary physical
custody, referring specifically to her interview with the children.6 5 The
supreme court, in vacating this order, held that the trial court did in fact
rely on the interviews, which were not available to the parties, and thus,
it was improper for the court to take them under consideration. 66
Procedurally, the supreme court determined that the actions of the
trial court did not conform to the requirements of the Georgia Uniform
Superior Court Rules 21-21.667 and the interview transcript was
improperly sealed.6 8 Records may be sealed according to these rules
''upon motion of a party or on the trial court's own motion and 'after
hearing, the court may limit access to court files respecting that
action."'69 The trial court did not hold a proper hearing after reasonable
notice according to the enumerated rules; instead, the trial court issued
an order that did not make the necessary findings to support a restriction
of public access as to the transcripts. 70

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at 202-03, 787 S.E.2d at 169.
Id. at 203, 787 S.E.2d at 169.
301 Ga. 211, 800 S.E.2d 288 (2017).
Id. at 212, 800 S.E.2d at 289-90.
Id. at 212-15, 800 S.E.2d at 291.
Id. at 217, 800 S.E.2d at 293.
Ga. Unif. Super. Ct. R. 21-21.6 (2017).
Altman, 301 Ga. at 216, 800 S.E.2d at 292.
Id.
Id. at 217-18, 800 S.E.2d at 293.

2017]

DOMESTIC RELATIONS

91

The court of appeals had two decisions tailored to third party custody
arrangements.71 First, in Sheffield v. Sheffield, 72 the court of appeals
reversed the trial court's grant of joint legal custody between a mother
and a grandmother, with the grandmother having primary physical
custody. 73 The mother appealed and argued the trial court erred in
granting joint legal custody of the child to the mother and the
grandmother after finding the mother was fit to parent. The grandmother
was the child's primary caretaker since birth, while the mother proved
unwilling to participate in the child's specialized care. The trial court
found that it was in the best interest of the child to remain in the care of
the grandmother and further concluded that the child would suffer longterm emotional harm if she were to be in the mother's care. However, the
court still made the finding that the mother was fit under Georgia law.7 4
The standard to grant a third party custody of a child requires a
showing that awarding custody to the parent would cause physical harm
or significant, long-term emotional harm to the child through clear and
convincing evidence. 75 However, this is not applicable if one or both of the
parents are suitable for custody. 76 As a result, although the trial court
likely found that the grandmother met the requirement for third party
custody, joint custody with a third party is not proper because the mother
was also found fit.77

Second, the court of appeals, in Marks v. Soles, 78 addressed several
issues outside of custody, but for the purposes of this section the focus is
on the decision as it related to third party custody. In Marks, the mother
had three children who were removed from her custody. The oldest two
children's father was Jason Soles. The trial court granted Soles and the
mother joint legal custody of the oldest two children, with Soles having
primary physical custody. Brad Lane was the father of the youngest
child. The trial court awarded joint legal custody of the youngest child to
the mother, Lane, and the paternal grandparents, with the grandparents
having primary physical custody.7 9 The mother appealed, arguing that

71. See generally Sheffield v. Sheffield, 338 Ga. App. 667, 791 S.E.2d 428 (2016); Marks
v. Soles, 339 Ga. App. 380, 793 S.E.2d 587 (2016).
72. 338 Ga. App. 667, 791 S.E.2d 428 (2016).
73. Id. at 667, 339 Ga. App. at 429.
74. Id. at 667-68, 791 S.E.2d at 429.
75. Id. at 668, 791 S.E.2d at 430.
76. Id. at 669, 791 S.E.2d at 430.
77. Id.
78. 339 Ga. App. 380, 793 S.E.2d 587 (2016).
79. Id. at 380, 793 S.E.2d at 589.
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the trial court erred in granting the grandparents primary physical
custody, and the court of appeals agreed.8 0
The court of appeals vacated and remanded the trial court's decision
by relying on the supreme court's emphasis that "joint custody
arrangements do not include third parties when one or both parents are
suitable custodians."81 The trial court failed to make a finding regarding
the mother's or Lane's fitness as a parent and thus was not authorized to
award the paternal grandparents primary physical custody or joint legal
custody. 82
The Georgia General Assembly enacted several changes to O.C.G.A.
§ 19-7-3 during the 2017 Georgia Legislative Session as it relates to
grandparent visitation. The General Assembly expanded what used to be
"grandparent" into "family member," which includes grandparents,
great-grandparents, and siblings of the parent effective as of July 1,
2016.83 Additionally, the evidentiary standard the court should apply to
determine whether such "family member" visitation is required is
enumerated as "clear and convincing evidence." 84 Finally, the General
Assembly added that "the mere absence of an opportunity for a child to
develop a relationship with a family member" will not meet the threshold,
unless there is a substantial pre-existing relationship between the child
and such family member.8 5 This also applies to the definition of "family
member" in O.C.G.A

§§ 19-8-1386 and 19-8-1587 relating to the petition

for adoption and when objections to adoptions may be filed,
respectively.8 8
The Georgia General Assembly also enacted several changes during
the 2017 Georgia Legislative Session that impact voluntary
acknowledgment of legitimation, acknowledgment of paternity, and
hospital procedures and responsibilities for establishing paternity.
Effective July 1, 2017, under O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2,89 the definition of 'legal
father" no longer includes a person determined to be the father of a child
by a final paternity order, meaning that an unwed father needs to

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 385, 793 S.E.2d at 592.
Id. at 385-86, 793 S.E.2d at 592-93.
Id. at 386, 793 S.E.2d at 593.
O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3(a).
O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3(c)(1).
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 19-8-13 (2017).
O.C.G.A. § 19-8-15 (2017).
O.C.G.A. §§ 19-8-13, 19-8-15.
O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2 (2017).
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legitimate the child in order to be considered the "legal father." 90
Additionally, the entirety of the code section relating to acknowledgment
of legitimation was repealed effective July 1, 2016.91 The General
Assembly amended O.C.G.A. § 19-7-22,92 effective July 1, 2016, to
distinguish between "legal father" and "biological father" as it relates to
a petition for legitimation. Also, there were some accompanying
procedural changes involving both the biological and legal father in
legitimation. 93
Finally, the General Assembly amended O.C.G.A. § 19-7-2794 as it
relates to hospitals' program for establishing paternity.95 The
amendment requires hospitals that offer labor and delivery services to
provide to the mother and alleged father the following: information on
administratively establishing paternity; the differences between
paternity and legitimation; the duty to support a child upon
acknowledgment of paternity; and availability of judicial determinations
of paternity.9 6 The hospital must also provide the opportunity to execute
a voluntary acknowledgement of paternity if a notary is available at the
hospital, file the signed acknowledgement with the State Office of Vital
Records within thirty days of its execution, and provide the parents with
copies.97
V. CHILD SUPPORT

The supreme court analyzed the construction and application of a
section of the child support guidelines that provides the trial court a
remedy when a party to a child support modification action is
uncooperative in providing reliable financial evidence. 98 In Jackson v.
Sanders,9 9 the trial court granted the mother's upward child support
modification. The father was uncooperative and did not provide sufficient
information to the court to enable determination of the amount of the
modification. The trial court found the father's evidence to be
"incomplete, inconsistent, inaccurate, and not credible" as it related to

90. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2(43) (2017).
91. O.C.G.A. § 19-7-21.1 (2008), repealed by Ga. S. Bill 64, 2016 Ga. Laws 404,
(effective July 1, 2016).
92. O.C.G.A. § 19-7-22 (2017).
93. O.C.G.A. § 19-7-22(a).
94. O.C.G.A. § 19-7-27 (2017).
95. Id.
96. O.C.G.A. § 19-7-27(a)(1), (3), (4).
97. O.C.G.A. § 19-7-27(c)(1)-(3).
98. O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15(f)(4)(B) (2017).
99. 299 Ga. 332, 788 S.E.2d 387 (2016).
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calculating his gross income. 100 The trial court, in its discretion, applied
the remedy provided to the court under the applicable statute. The
remedy may be applied if the case is a modification and two conditions
precedent are met:
[The court] may increase the child support of the parent failing or
refusing to produce evidence of income by an increment of at least [ten]
percent per year of such parent's gross income for each year since the
final child support order was entered or last modified and shall
calculate the basic child support obligation using the increased
amount as such parent's gross income.10 1
The two conditions precedent are as follows: (1) the parent has failed
to produce, and (2) there is not otherwise available, credible evidence
establishing a significant portion of the parent's total gross income as
defined in the statute. Upon finding the two conditions had been met, the
trial court applied an increase of 4% instead of "at least 10 percent" per
the statute. 102

On appeal, and affirmed by the supreme court, the court of appeals
determined that it was within the trial court's discretion to apply the
statute. 103 However, if the court uses its discretion and applies the
discretionary statute, the court is bound to follow the mandatory
percentage provisions within the statute. 104
In Wynn v. Craven,105 the issue was the applicability of the doctrine of
laches to the collection of unpaid child support. The parties divorced in
2000 and the divorce decree ordered the father to pay the mother child
support of 20% of his weekly income, but not less than $100 per week.
The mother sought to collect arrearages twice, calculating the amounts
at $100 per week, and the father paid the amounts requested. 106
In 2014, the father sought a change in custody and the mother filed a
motion for contempt, saying that the father had not been paying the
agreed upon 20% of his gross weekly income. The mother provided
evidence that the father was over $72,000 in arrears. The trial court
found that the mother had accepted the payments of $100 per week for
over a decade and she did not exercise due diligence in calculating the
amount of child support owed by the father. The court further found that
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Id. at 332, 788 S.E.2d at 389.
Id. at 332-33, 788 S.E.2d at 389 (citing O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15(f)(4)(B)).
Id. at 333, 788 S.E.2d at 389.
Id. at 337, 788 S.E.2d at 392.
Id. at 335, 788 S.E.2d at 391.
301 Ga. 30, 799 S.E.2d 172 (2017).
Id. at 30-31, 799 S.E.2d at 173.
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the doctrine of laches precluded the mother's claim, and calculated the
amount the father owed at $100 per week. 107
The supreme court reversed, reasoning that child support obligations
are not subject to the doctrine of laches, and cannot be waived
retroactively.108 The right to child support is the child's right, not the
mother's right. 109 The obligation, therefore, could not be waived by the
mother's failure to request the full 20% of the father's income. The trial
court was without authority when it attempted to alter the clear
language of the divorce decree awarding child support of 20% of the
father's income, and forgave the father's child support arrearage. 110
VI. EQUITABLE DIVISION
During this survey period, the supreme court reviewed two cases
which involved determinations of whether certain payments were in the
nature of equitable division of marital property or alimony."' The issue
in Coursey v. Coursey 12 arose during a post-divorce contempt proceeding.
At the conclusion of the underlying divorce case, based on the jury's
verdict regarding the division of property, the divorce decree required the
husband to pay the wife one-third of the gross of his pension funds until
the wife remarried, though a portion of the pension funds payable to the
wife was to be withheld for the payment of taxes. The jury declined to
award alimony to the wife. Neither party appealed the jury's verdict nor
the final decree of divorce. 113
The wife later moved for contempt when the husband failed to pay her
the proportionate increase in the pension funds. Shortly after the wife
filed her motion for contempt, the husband filed a motion for termination
of alimony because he alleged the wife was remarried and that he made
overpayments of the pension funds to the wife. After conducting an
evidentiary hearing, the trial court found the husband in contempt of the
divorce decree, concluded that he owed the wife $8,490.25 in unpaid
pension payments, and ordered the husband to repay the amount owed
in monthly installments. In its final order on the contempt action, the
trial court incorporated a previous order, in which it reiterated the

107. Id. at 31, 799 S.E.2d at 173.
108. Id. at 32, 799 S.E.2d at 173-74.
109. Id. at 32, 799 S.E.2d at 174.
110. Id. at 33-34, 799 S.E.2d at 175.
111. See generally Coursey v. Coursey, 299 Ga. 203, 787 S.E.2d 199 (2016); Frost v.
Frost, 299 Ga. 278, 787 S.E.2d 693 (2016).
112. 299 Ga. 203, 787 S.E.2d 199 (2016).
113. Id. at 203, 787 S.E.2d at 200.
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language in the final divorce decree, that the pension fund payments to
the wife were marital property. 114
On appeal, the husband maintained that the payments at issue were
not marital property, but rather constituted periodic alimony; and
because the jury expressly denied alimony to the wife, the husband
contended he did not owe the wife and could not be held in contempt. The
appellate court held this to be incorrect. 15 Alimony is "an allowance out
of one party's estate, made for the support of the other party when living
separately."11 6 Periodic alimony is characterized by an indefinite number
of payments, may be contingent, may be indeterminable as to the total
amount, and typically terminates on the death of the surviving spouse or
the remarriage of the receiving spouse.' 1 7 Marital property has been
defined as "assets acquired from the labor and investments of the parties
during the marriage."1 18 Marital property is subject to equitable
division.119 The law is well settled that retirement benefits acquired
during the marriage are marital property subject to equitable division. 120
At the time of the divorce, the husband was retired and receiving his
pension benefits in monthly installments. The pension benefits were not
transformed into periodic alimony because they were paid to the wife on
a monthly basis. The trial court did not err when it determined that the
pension payments to the wife constituted marital property, and it did not
err in holding the husband in contempt.121 As to the limitation that the
pension benefit payments end upon the wife's remarriage, this was an
error made by the jury and reinforced by its incorporation into the divorce
decree, insofar as remarriage of the receiving spouse does not typically
terminate an obligation that is the result of the equitable division of
marital property. However, since neither party sought appellate review
or modification of the divorce decree, the limitation was valid.1 22
Two weeks later, in Frost v. Frost,123 the supreme court again
addressed equitable division of assets versus alimony, and also dealt with
clergy-penitent privilege. After a bench trial in this divorce action, as part
of the alimony award, the trial court granted the wife one-half of the
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Id. at 203-04, 787 S.E.2d at 200-01.
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Id.
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husband's military retirement pay until the wife dies or remarries.1 24 On
appeal, the appellate court determined that the lower court erred in
making the award of alimony as opposed to treating it as a marital asset
subject to equitable division. 125
Retirement benefits, if acquired during the marriage, are marital
property subject to equitable division.1 26 Because one spouse's retirement
pay acquired from the spouse's employment during the marriage is
marital property subject to equitable division, an award of a portion of
such periodic payments does not terminate upon the remarriage of the
party to whom it is awarded. Accordingly, that portion of the trial court's
order declaring that payment of the husband's military retirement
benefits shall continue until the wife dies or remarries was an error.1 27
At trial, the wife sought to admit into evidence an audio recording she
made of a meeting between the parties and their church pastor held after
the complaint was filed and while the parties were attempting to reach a
settlement of their claims. The wife sought to admit the recording as
evidence the husband agreed at the meeting to a settlement of financial
issues raised in the action.1 28 The recording was made without the
knowledge or consent of the other parties to the conversation, and the
husband objected to its admission on the ground that the conversation
with the pastor was privileged, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 24-5-502,129 which
creates a privilege for any communication made by any person seeking
counseling to any minister of the Gospel or similar functionary.1 30 The
supreme court held that given the totality of the admitted circumstances
surrounding the meeting, the trial court did not err in finding the
meeting was a marriage counseling session with the parties' minister,
and did not err in excluding the recording of the meeting pursuant to the
clergy-penitent privilege.131
VII. CONTEMPT
The boundaries of the remedy of contempt were clarified in several
cases during the survey period.
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Id. at 278, 787 S.E.2d at 694.
Id. at 278-79, 787 S.E.2d at 694.
Id. at 279, 787 S.E.2d at 694.
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O.C.G.A. § 24-5-502 (2017).
Frost, 299 Ga. at 279, 787 S.E.2d at 694.
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A. Nature of the Remedy
The primary purpose of civil contempt is to force compliance with an
order. 132 Criminal contempt exists to preserve the court's authority and
to punish for disobedience of an order. 133 Criminal contempt may be
direct-in the presence of the court-or indirect-out of the court's
presence. 134 Both remedies can be used to enforce a child support or
alimony order, but civil contempt cannot be used to enforce a money
judgment.135 The difference is that O.C.G.A. § 19-6-4136 specifically
authorizes the former, but no statute authorizes the latter.137
In Shooter Alley, Inc. v. City of Doraville,13 8 a civil contempt sanction
for each future violation of a civil injunction was held to be a valid civil
contempt order. 139 In that case, an injunction prohibiting certain conduct
was entered against Shooter Alley, Inc. In a subsequent contempt
proceeding, Shooter Alley, Inc. was found to have violated the injunction
and found guilty of criminal contempt for which it was fined. The trial
court also found the respondent guilty of civil contempt and set a
prospective fine for each future violation of the injunction. 140 This was
not an award of civil contempt based on an anticipatory breach of the
injunction. 141 Rather, civil enforcement was awarded after violation of
the injunction and thus, was a valid civil contempt award. 142 Query:
Would such an award be sustained for repetitive failure to pay court
ordered support or repeated refusals of visitation ordered by a divorce
decree?
B. Limits of the Contempt Power
A divorce decree directed the former husband to "timely" quitclaim
property to the wife and ordered the wife to be responsible for all debt
service and repairs to the property after a specified date. 143 The court's
finding that the husband was in contempt for failure to execute the deed
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Ensley v. Ensley, 239 Ga. 860, 861, 238 S.E.2d 920, 921 (1977).
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was upheld, but the portions of the order directing the husband to pay
the repairs to the property and to share in the debt service after the date
for which the wife was responsible for those payments was an
impermissible modification of the decree. 144
C. Parties Within the Reach of the Contempt Power
In Sullivan v. Bunnell, 145 the husband was ordered to send his
retirement account payment to the wife by their divorce decree. 146 The
husband, who had moved to California while the Georgia divorce was
ongoing, later gave his adult daughter power of attorney to act on his
behalf. The husband developed dementia and the daughter was a
California resident who assisted the husband in communications with
his lawyer in the divorce proceedings and had knowledge of the decree's
provisions. 14 7 When the daughter later told the former wife the
retirement payment would not be made, she became the target of a
contempt citation. Since the daughter had actual notice of the allegedly
violated order and acted as a representative of her father, she could be
held in contempt of the order. 148
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Id. at 603, 800 S.E.2d at 567.
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Id. at 284-85, 797 S.E.2d at 501.
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